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THE ECONOMIC AND ETHICAL AMBIGUITIES OF
AFRICAN DEBT FORGIVENESS
Christopher B. Barrett

ABSTRACT

Subsaharan African states clearly labor under an extraordinary weight of external debt. A
strong groundswell of opinion has fonned behind debt forgiveness efforts. The plight of Africa's
poor demands serious response from creditors and donors, not bo mention their own governments.
yet the common economic arguments for debt relief find little empirical support in SSA. In
particular, there is no evidence of debt overhang serving as a tax on investment or GDP growth. The
real problem of external debt in SSA is the heavy marginal tax it levies on current account receipts.
Surely this contributes to persistent balance-of-payments crises. The most important dimension of
debt relief for SSA states is, thus, less stock reduction than release from the foreign exchange
demands of repayment.

THE ECONOMIC AND ETHICAL AMBIGUITIES OF

AFRICAN DEBT FORGIVENESS

1

While the declining severity of Latin American debt has reduced global concerns about the
Third W orId debt crisis, external debt continues to bedevil most of the economies of Subsaharan
Africa (SSA). SSA accounted for only 10.1% of developing country external debt at the end of 1994,
yet the almost $200 billion owed by SSA countries was one-third greater than their GNP and almost
four times their export earnings. 1 Several international leaders and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) have advanced major proposals for debt remission for severely indebted, low-income and
middle-income countries (SILICs and SIMICs, respectively), most of which are in SSA.
Unlike debt reduction efforts elsewhere in the developing world, where private creditors hold
46.1 % of total long-term debt outstanding and multilateral development banks (including the IMF)
account for only 15.1%, SSA's long-term debt is owed primarily (80.4%) to official creditors, with
almost one-third to multilateral agencies. Thus the focus in SSA is on official debt forgiveness.
There have been some small steps in this direction by bilateral official creditors, beginning with
agreements reached at the 1988 G-7 summit in Toronto, and most recently extended by the Paris
Club's Naples terms in December 1994. Most analysts believe that these measures come up short2
)

and have only postponed more substantial remission by official creditors.
This paper analyzes the issue of African debt forgiveness. While many believe that SSA
cannot grow out of its external debt, this does not mean debt has caused African economic decline.

I thank Sudarshan Gooptu, Nawal Kamel, Bill Peters, Ed Rossmiller, Jon Sanford, Nic van de Walle,
and session participants at the 1996 annual meeting of the International Studies Association for
helpful discussions. Shane Sherlund provided able research assistance. This work was supported by
the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station and approved as UAES journal paper 4914.
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Indeed, a central point of confusion in the debate about African debt forgiveness is the amount of
growth stimulus one can reasonably expect.

This point gets complicated by all-too-common

indiscriminate borrowing from the literature on commercial debt problems in Latin America, despite
the substantial structural differences between the African and Latin American cases. The debt crisis
is part of Africa's prolonged economic malaise and social and environmental crises, and it is not
axiomatic that substantial debt forgiveness is central to the resolution of these challenges. Nor do
ethical arguments unambiguously favor debt remission. The evidence I present in this paper favors
highly differentiated debt relief structured to relieve the balance of payments burdens associated with
African debt and to benefit most and directly vulnerable subpopulations. The ambiguous economic
and ethical merits of African debt forgiveness necessitate hard political choices, similar in important
respects to contemporaneous choices regarding democratization, food aid or the safeguarding of
tropical ecosystems.

The Case For Debt Forgiveness
Most S SA governments have run arrears on principal and interest payments in the past
decade. Prolonged recession in SSA has convinced many observers that arrearages signal an
excessive debt burden that must be reduced for both economic and ethical reasons. The primary
economic arguments advanced for debt remission follow from the existence of a "debt overhang,"
which Krugman (1988) defines as debt in excess of the expected present value of future resource
transfers. Debt overhang suggests the existence of a debt Laffer curve, in which expected repayments
rise with debt stocks up to some point, then decrease thereafter as the probability of repayment falls.
The central argument of the debt overhang hypothesis is that since increased future output increases
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repayment expectations, debt service may act as an ad valorem tax on investment, thereby depressing
investment demand. 3 An external debt overhang may also increase the riskiness of a debtor country's
domestic debt, thereby reducing investment funds and increasing local interest rates (Cline, 1995; de
Aghion and de Hinestrosa, 1995). Investment rates in S SA were low and falling from 1980 to 1993:
gross domestic investment (GDI) fell 2.8% per year to 16% ofGDP. By comparison, annual GDI
growth over the same period was 2.4% in all low- and middle-income countries, reaching 24% of
GDP (World Bank, 1995). Given strong linkages from investment to GDP growth (Levine and
Renelt, 1991), any investment dampening effects of debt are potentially quite serious for SSA
economies. The question nonetheless remains as to whether S SA has exhibited the macroeconomic
drag posited by the debt overhang hypothesis. Evidence from other regions is mixed (Bulow and
Rogoff, 1990; Claessens, 1990; Cohen, 1993; Cline, 1995).
The notion of debt overhang leads directly to widespread claims that debt reduction may
benefit creditors as well as debtors. This occurs directly by increasing expected receipts, either by
reducing the probability of default or by reducing macroeconomic distortions. It can also occur
indirectly, by fostering macroeconomic growth in debtor nations and thereby stimulating demand for
creditor country exports, providing creditors with new investment opportunities offering high yields
and portfolio diversification opportunities, or (more speculatively) reducing international emigration
and environmental degradation. Empirical evidence from SSA I present in the penultimate section,
however, indicates that debt overhang has not adversely affected investment or growth. Therefore,
debt forgiveness can not be expected to benefit creditors significantly.
A related issue is that external debt servicing absorbs a substantial share of scarce foreign
exchange receipts, thereby reducing SSA's ability to import necessary food, medicines, fuel, spare
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parts and capital equipment. This argument harkens back to the "two-gap" models popular in the
World Bank in the 1960s, which posited foreign exchange was a binding constraint on development.
Data from SSA support the hypothesis that debt servicing has heavily taxed current account receipts.
A rather different economic argument for debt forgiveness focuses on the notion of "loan
pushing," wherein lenders supply more credit to borrowers than the latter would voluntarily contract
under the prevailing terms4 (Basu, 1991). Essentially, loan-pushing is the excess-supply equilibria
counterpart to more familiar excess-demand equilibria models of credit rationing. It turns on the
ability of lenders to make credible "take-it-or-Ieave-it" credit offers. If loans fail to generate the
returns necessary to finance repayment for reasons other than borrower misconduct (i. e., due to
external shocks), then in equilibrium a lender will not punish the borrower's nonpayment. 5 Loan
pushing necessarily exposes the borrower to greater risk, and debt forgiveness is thus a means of risk
sharing among borrowers and lenders. There is widespread evidence of such loan pushing in S SA
by commercial lenders in the 1970s, by bilateral official lenders from the 1970s through the early- to
mid-1980s, and by the multilateral development banks since the early 1980s (Gordon, 1993; Nafziger,
1993).
Fafchamps (forthcoming) offers a similar but distinct argument concerning a "conditionality
trap." Conditionality of the sort required by the IMF-and thus de facto prerequisite to any SSA
debt rescheduling or reduction by the London or Paris Clubs-helps borrowers ex ante to get
additional loans by committing them to policies that enhance repayment prospects. Ex post, however,
conditionality haunts the debtor by inducing excessive borrowing and periodic rescheduling and
increases creditors' leverage over debtor nations.
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The common denominator of the loan-pushing and conditionality trap arguments is that
borrowers take on predictably excessive debt volumes and that efficient risk-sharing favors some
limited form of debt reduction. The extent of optional write-downs will necessarily vary according
to the borrower's circumstances. Creditors have implicitly recognized they should bear more of the
risk by increasing the grant element of recent development finance. But the approach of highly
differentiated debt reduction6 runs counter to the uniform approaches adopted thus far by the Paris
Club (e.g., Toronto or Naples terms) or those proposed by leading NGOs in the debate (e.g.,
OXFAM).
These economic arguments about "conditionality traps" and "loan pushing" lead directly to
the various ethical arguments in favor of debt forgiveness for SSA states: infringement on sovereignty
and the regressive distribution of repayment burdens and risk-bearing. The need to roll over principal
repayments and the mechanics of debt renegotiations have given foreign creditors and donors
unprecedented influence over domestic economic policy and the internal politics of borrowing nations
(Mosley, Harrigan and Toye, 1991; Helleiner, 1992; Callaghy and Ravenhill, 1993). African leaders
and their subjects justifiably object to the power exercised by international actors. But it is probably
misguided to believe that debt remission would substantially relieve the power imbalance between
poor African states and their bilateral and multilateral benefactors. Broader economic, environmental
and political crises in Africa will continue to draw in foreign creditors, donors and technical assistants
who will exert considerable influence over the course of near-term African development. While it is
true that external debt burdens are associated with some infringement on sovereignty, the condition
would surely exist in S SA even in the absence of any significant debt.

6
More compellingly, advocates for African debt forgiveness appeal to compassion and justice
for marginalized subpopulations, observing that the burdens of external debt servicing seem to fall
disproportionately on marginalized populations, who rarely benefitted initially from borrowed funds.
While the social impact of the debt crisis cannot be separated convincingly from the broader problems
of deep, prolonged recession and halting, often ineffective efforts at structural economic reform, the
vulnerable of SSA have undeniably suffered considerably over the past decade. Providing durable
relief to the poor is of paramount concern to all parties serious about development. While S SA debt
forgiveness represents a modest amount to creditors, it seems a vast sum to poor Africans whose
standards of living have declined with macroeconomic stabilization efforts based on expenditure
reduction. Toward this end many NGOs are calling for an unrepeatable debt forgiveness. For
example, the UK's Jubilee 2000 movement invokes the pentateuchal concept of rare acts of grace to
clear unpayable debts to motivate a call for one-off, concerted debt remission (peters, 1995). In
biblical times such jubilee years were seen as necessary to ameliorate economic inequalities that were
seen as both unjust and socially dangerous. Conditions seem reasonably similar today.7 The rub, of
course, is that debt forgiveness accrues to the very states that neglected the vulnerable in imprudent
borrowing and kleptocratic spending programs and later in sometimes-harsh adjustment measures.
Unless one believes that the current generation of SSA leaders are markedly more effective and
trustworthy stewards of their subjects, creative approaches to debt forgiveness will be necessary to
circumvent the governance problems that are partly to blame for the real hardships of the past decade
plus.
Development is an inherently risky endeavor; many try but not all succeed. Loans are
extended to finance uncertain ventures. Most industrial nations have bankruptcy laws governing the
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settlement of debts made unserviceable by the failure of the borrowing enterprise, but there are no
analogous rules governing sovereign debt. Without debt forgiveness, the full burden of the risks of
debt-financed development falls on the shoulders of low-income states although responsibility for
identical projects would not rest with recipients were they financed by grants. The problem of failed
development projects is particularly serious in SSA. Creditors, including the MDBs, could bear more
of this cost, as has been implicitly recognized by the movement in recent years to a higher proportion
of grant financing (Sanford, 1993).

The Case Against Substantial Debt Forgiveness
Opponents of substantial African debt forgiveness likewise invoke concerns regarding
economic efficiency and long-term growth, compassion, and justice. Cline (1995, p. 368) perhaps
sums up this perspective best when he writes, "the key issue [in SSA debt] is policy reform, not debt
forgiveness."

Most of the arguments against substantial debt forgiveness-and the modifier

"substantial" is crucial, if evasive--center on the consequences of forgiveness for governments'
incentives and capacity to implement assiduous economic policy and on the impact of debt
forgiveness on equally (or more) deserving third parties.
Many powerful participants in the debt forgiveness debate (e.g., Germany, Japan, and the

JMF) express grave concerns over the moral hazard effects of debt forgiveness. It seems manifestly
unfair to penalize prudent states that maintained sustainable fiscal and external payment balances in
favor of those who squandered borrowed funds. Because it is impossible to distinguish clearly
between the unlucky and the unscrupulous, ex post debt forgiveness will almost surely reward
excessively those who have eschewed the hard but necessary policy choices of macroeconomic
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adjustment. Few African countries have made the sorts of broad-based macroeconomic reforms
essential to sustainable economic growth (World Bank, 1994), but within SSA there have been
marked differences in the intensity of adjustment efforts. Countries such as Burkina Faso, the
Gambia, and Ghana have made considerable sacrifices to adjust to the external shocks and internal
policy errors that made external debt servicing particularly onerous. Yet those nations will receive
less for their pains than those who delayed or refused to adjust, and nations that behaved assiduously
in the face of volatile external conditions (e.g., Botswana, Mauritius) would be denied entirely. Not
only does debt forgiveness inversely related to a nation's previous sacrifices discourage the sort of
prompt and prudent macroeconomic response to exogenous economic shocks that must surely be a
central lesson of the present debt crisis, but it goes against the principle that rewards ought to be
commensurate with effort.
Even with a favorable policy environment, African development will take a long time
(Helleiner, 1992). Long-term development requires financing, whether by foreign aid, direct
investment, portfolio equity investment, or borrowing. Thus sustained access to international finance
appears crucial to the broader objectives of economic growth and poverty alleviation in SSA. The
region has not participated in the portfolio equity investment and direct foreign investment booms of
the early 1990s, and aid to most SSA states has been flat or falling. Recourse to credit thus remains
important to the financing of imports of consumer products and intermediate inputs essential to
improving living standards and GDP in SSA economies. The burgeoning theoretical literature on
sovereign debt highlights how access to credit hinges on a borrower's reputation and on creditors'
commitment to punish borrowers who fail to repay, either by restricting capital access or through
trade sanctions (Eaton and Fernandez, 1995). Debt forgiveness may ameliorate the reputational costs
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of default, but this is a matter of degree not kind. The formal models not withstanding, the empirical
literature offers no clear evidence as to whether failure to pay in fact harms recalcitrant borrowers'
future trade or credit market access (Eichengreen and Portes, 1989; OzIer 1989, 1993). It is widely
believed that failure to repay debts cuts sovereign borrowers off from capital markets: "myopic
borrowers default on loans, while nonmyopic borrowers do not" (English, 1996, p. 272).
While capital markets access might not concern S SA governments much since so little
financing comes from private creditors, the effect of debt forgiveness on official financing flows
matters enormously. In the face of limited-and shrinking-foreign aid budgets, it is important to
remember that a certain amount of debt forgiveness will almost surely be "paid for" out of funds that
would otherwise flow as aid. Certainly not all, and probably not most debt forgiveness would be
"additional" financing. For example, funds for bilateral debt forgiveness must be appropriated by the
national legislature in many creditor nations (Sanford, 1993, 1995). In claiming that debt is the
primary obstacle to African economic and human recovery, the most vociferous proponents of debt
forgiveness risk convincing donor country legislatures that debt relief should suffice and aid programs
can be ended. This is akin to the argument advanced by Bulow and Rogoff (1990) against the
establishment of an international debt discount facility, and it applies equally to the case of official
debts owed by African states. Note that while Japan has been notably reluctant to forgive debts owed
it by African states, it has nonetheless become the leading provider of development assistance funds
over the past decade. Indeed, the Japanese position has long been that deep or widespread debt
forgiveness is misguided (Hecht, 1995).8 In a similar spirit, the IMP has been staunchly opposed to
the use of aid money for one-off debt write-downs, claiming that forgiveness is not the highest return
use of scarce development funds. Perhaps, surprisingly, some African governments (e.g., Cote
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d'Ivoire) agree. It is an extremely difficult matter to establish what is the best expected use of funds
for Africa. If the additionality of debt forgiveness proves modest, there is no getting around the hard
calculus of the relative rates of return to different uses of the funds. In some settings this would
probably not favor debt forgiveness, especially of concessionalloans not presently being serviced.
Moreover, even if African debt forgiveness is additional for S SA, it might not be for the rest
of the world. There is a real prospect that African debt forgiveness may deprive the equally deserving
poor in nonbeneficiary nations of access to low-cost funds by reducing the aggregate flow of new aid
money (and less likely by raising the costs of borrowing from MDBs). Fearing that African debt relief
might be paid for indirectly by nonbeneficiaries in other regions, IDA borrowing nations such as
Bolivia, China, and India have voiced opposition to forgiveness.
Next to bilateral official creditors, the multilateral development banks (MDBs) are the largest
creditors to S SA and now the dominant source of new disbursements. The MDBs have thus far
resisted debt rescheduling or reduction, in part on the claim that it could jeopardize development
banks' bond ratings and, thereby, raise their costs of borrowing and the interest rates they pass on
to borrowing states, notably those not benefitting from debt forgiveness. This is a somewhat
disingenuous elaim, since SSA debtors represent a small portion ofMDBs' market-financed loans.
For instance, SSA obligations to the mRD-the arm of the World Bank financed through capital
markets-amounted to only $8.2 billion at end-1993, less than 8% of total mRD claims: twice its
existing loan-loss provisions and less than the half of the Bank's reserves. Even a total write-off of
SSA obligations to the ffiRD need not impact its borrowing on international capital markets.
Moreover, if the recent experience of U.S. money center banks is any indication, reducing exposure
to nonperforming sovereign loans can reduce financial institutions' cost of funds. The bulk of S SA
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debt owed MOBs derives from concessional facilities (e.g., ADF, IDA) and the IMF, all of which are
funded directly by member governments and not at all through borrowing on capital markets. Of
course the corollary to this is that remission of concessionalloans gives scant real relief-as official
bilateral debt forgiveness episodes of the past decade clearly demonstrate9-returning one to the
earlier question of whether funds are best used to write down debts or as new grants or concessional
financing.
Debt forgiveness that increases net financial flows to African nations in any significant volume
raises the possibility of "Dutch disease" effects. It is well-known that a sharp exogenous increase in
net foreign exchange revenues can stimulate inflation and real exchange rate appreciation, thereby
hurting the competitiveness of exportables sectors in the economy. Paradoxically, debt relief of any
substantial volume thus has the potential to harm longer-run current account balances by causing
endogenous currency revaluation and reducing export competitiveness.

Given that poor

macroeconomic management of exogenous shocks (both good and bad) helped precipitate the African
debt crisis, as well as the broader economic crisis of which it is a part, there are grounds for concern
on this point. Hence a conundrum: if debt forgiveness comes in any substantial volume, it could
destabilize still poorly managed SSA macro economies, but if not, it offers no real relief This
suggests that maybe debt is not the appropriate focus of attention, but merely a symptom of the larger
development challenge.
There is, moreover, an eminently practical question: what is the point of debt forgiveness in
countries that do not service their debt? Efforts to forgive African debts largely seek to transform
the present de facto forgiveness, wherein creditors and borrowers both recognize that African
external debts will never be paid off in full, into de jure remission. But this is not costless. In
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domestic debt work-outs, bankruptcy settlement laws obviate the problems of creditor heterogeneity
and coordination problems that have bedeviled commercial bank sovereign debt renegotiations. No
such mechanisms are available for resolving sovereign debt. If anything, the official creditors to
whom SSA states owe most of their debt have more diverse interests and agendas than the
commercial banks, while the distribution of burdens among official creditors is proving an enormously
sensitive issue. What is the point of costly, protracted negotiations over the issue, especially given
that debtors' scarce technocrats' time might be better used managing their economies instead of
negotiating debt relief? 10 There are huge political obstacles to radical African debt reduction
(Gordon, 1993), so perhaps it would be wisest to let those who are so motivated forgive debts, but
not to invest much in negotiating concerted remission.
Finally, consider the realpolitik argument: creditors do not forgive debts for humanitarian
reasons. The past decade's experience of bilateral official debt forgiveness for SSA has been of
limited remission of concessional debts for humanitarian purposes, ultimately providing scant relief
Meanwhile, serious debt relief has been reserved for countries serving primary geopolitical goals:
Egypt, Jordan, Poland. As Sanford (1995, p. 381) points out in his analysis of U.S. claims, "the debt
forgiveness provided to a few countries for strategic purposes thus accounts for much more money
than all the debt relief provided to poor countries for general humanitarian ends."

The Empirical Evidence on Subsaharan African Debt
Some of the economic arguments surrounding debt forgiveness can be tested econometrically,
although to the best of my knowledge no one has yet done so in the SSA case. Using 1983-92 data
on 23 S SA nations commonly identified as in need of debt forgiveness, I regressed net external
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transfers (disbursement less repayments and interest payments) on GDP, GDI, exports of goods and
nonfactor services, aid flows, and debt stocks. Table 1 presents the results.
The empirical evidence indicates that GDP and investment are positively related to net
transfers on debt in SSA, not negatively as the traditional debt overhang argument suggests. Each
extra dollar of GDP brings the country three extra cents in external finance, half of it from official
creditors. Gross domestic investment shows greater effects, with 15% coming from net external
transfers and 5% from official creditors. Rather than being a drag on growth and investment in SSA,
financial flows associated with external debt appear to support it. 11
The biggest effects are not in the national income and product accounts but in the balance of
payments, where net external transfers are negatively related to both exports and aid flows. Nearly
half of each extra dollar's export earnings exits the continent in the form of debt servicing, roughly
one-third to official creditors. The tax is thus not on domestic production or investment, but on
export expansion. No wonder African governments question whether they stand to benefit from
export promotion policies strongly advocated by foreign creditors. Moreover, 20 cents of each extra
dollar's overseas development assistance leaves the country as net transfers, almost all of it paying
off private creditors. This sharply diminishes the effectiveness of aid funds extended to support
infrastructure rehabilitation, environmental protection, institutional reforms, human capital
investments and other development activities.
Contrary to conventional wisdom (e.g., Helleiner, 1992; Nafziger, 1993; World Bank,
1994b), the empirical evidence suggests that a reduction in debt stock and servicing would likely
provide little in the way of investment of growth stimulus to SSA economies. It would nonetheless
yield immediate, significant balance of payments benefits. Arguments focusing on debt as a tax on
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investment and output are thus inappropriate in the SSA case. Rather, attention should be focused
on the strong relationship between net transfers on debt and nonfactor current account flows. Export
expansion and aid inflows have been heavily taxed for the servicing of external debt. Insofar as
continued balance of payments crises fuel capital flight and limit imports of necessary inputs to
manufacturing, marketing and the provision of basic human services, releasing this yoke appears the
primary economic argument for debt forgiveness in S SA.
The traditional claims of the macroeconomic drag associated with debt overhang do not
appear to stand up to empirical scrutiny in the SSA case. Does the opposing claim, that debt
forgiveness will induce punishment of nonpaying borrowers by international capital markets, thereby
choking off future development finance opportunities, fare any better in the data from SSA? The
question cannot be answered convincingly because there are too few SSA states that have retained
access to private loans to do any careful multivariate econometric analysis. 12 There are nonetheless
some basic findings worth reporting.
The severely or moderately indebted S SA countries who borrowed from private creditors in
1994 had outstanding principal and interest arrears averaging 22% of end-1993 total debt stock.
Substantial delinquency in payments clearly does not blockade even poor nations from access to loans
from private creditors. Moreover, naive univariate regressions show no evidence of a relationship
between the terms of private loans and a SSA borrower's previous repayment difficulties. In a crosssection of SSA countries, when one regresses the weighted average interest rate or maturity of new
private loans to SSA in 1994 on either end-1993 outstanding arrears or the number of times the
country rescheduled debt in the preceding decade, the coefficient estimates are statistically
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insignificantly different from zero. This is clearly a weak test,13 but it is nonetheless suggests that the
theoretical arguments against debt forgiveness, like those in favor, are somewhat offbase empirically.

Conclusions
Sub saharan African states clearly labor under an extraordinary weight of external debt.
Resolution of this situation remains difficult. A strong groundswell of opinion has formed behind
debt forgiveness efforts, and several bilateral official creditors have moved in this direction, although
the multilateral official creditors have yet to take substantial action toward rescheduling or reducing
their own claims on SSA debtors. The plight of Africa's poor demands serious response from
creditors and donors, not to mention their own governments. Yet the common economic arguments
for debt relief find little empirical support in SSA In particular, there is no evidence of debt overhang
serving as a tax on investment or GDP growth. Widespread expectations that debt relief might
"engineer" economic recovery thus seem misplaced. The debt crisis is more a symptom of prolonged
economic crisis in SSA than its cause.
The real problem of external debt in SSA is not its effect on growth or investment, but the
heavy tax is levies on current account receipts. The empirical evidence indicates that debt servicing
does not create disincentives to invest or produce in SSA, but at the margin external debt servicing
deprives SSA of almost halfits hard currency earnings. Surely this high marginal tax rate contributes
to persistent balance of payments crises. The most important dimension of debt relief for SSA states
is thus less stock reduction than release from the foreign exchange demands of repayment. Indeed,
if debt stock write-downs cause a reduction of more than 20% in aid flows to S SA-and 20% is
probably an optimistic assumption about the degree of additionality to expect in any significant stock
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relief-then the regression results in Table 1 suggest debt stock reduction would likely aggravate
rather than relieve foreign exchange shortages in SSA, without any direct positive effects on
investment or growth.
These empirical findings support Basu's (1991, p. 35) suggestion that "it will be necessary
to separate the issue of repayment from repayment in hard currency .... The large U.S. debt is not
as worrisome as third-world debt precisely because the United States can repay it in its own
currency." The manifest debt-servicing tax paid on export earnings cannot help but retard export
expansion. Cross-country macroeconomic evidence indicates that trade volume has a strong, positive
relationship to investment rates (Levine and Renelt, 1992). Since most analysts suggest that the
fundamental development task for S SA economies is to enhance export performance and improve
investment productivity (which depends fundamentally on access to imported inputs), reducing the
tax on export earnings by permitting local currency servicing of external debt may be the most
important step toward fruitful African debt relief.
While debt stock reduction deserves less emphasis than it receives in discussions of S SA debt,
there is a sound economic and ethical argument for partial and highly differentiated debt forgiveness
to provide a more efficient and equitable sharing of debt burdens associated with loan pushing and
conditionality traps. Given the history ofMDB lending to SSA, this clearly implies the need for
multilateral debt reduction, as has been recognized for some time (e.g., Mistry, 1989; Sanford, 1993).
Probably the greatest concern about S SA debt is that funds used to repay external creditors
could instead address severe and widespread human hardship on the continent. The poor of SSA
appear to have borne a disproportionate share of the adjustment and repayment burden of the past
decade ( Gibbon, Havnevik, and Hermele, 1993; Barrett and Dorosh, forthcoming). Many would like
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to use debt relief to accelerate poverty alleviation. As most governments and NGOs advocating
forgiveness recognize, debt renegotiation or remission would require continued conditionality. Future
conditionality could involve demonstrable commitments to poverty reduction and environmental
protection in the form of verifiable increases in outlays on primary health care, primary education, and
rural infrastructure rehabilitation. Keep in mind that increased real expenditures to care for the poor
and the environment must be reconciled with the continued need for reduced fiscal deficits in SSA,
which is difficult given a thin tax base and limited collection capabilities. External debt relief could
help in the form of local currency servicing with payments dedicated to financing poverty alleviation
and environmental protection programs. 14 The principle of subsidiarity should govern these efforts,
devolving authority for project design, implementation, and evaluation from central governments to
communities.
The concentration of Sub saharan Africa's external debt in the hands of official creditors and
the ambiguous nature of the economics and ethics of African debt forgiveness make this an inherently
political question. The vigor of the contemporary debate is thus a blessing in that it subjects sloppy
ideological and myopic technical arguments to careful scrutiny. There is a strong ethical case to be
made for bold economic policies to combat widespread African poverty. The appropriate way to do
this, however, depends on where available funds will have the greatest expected impact. It is by no
means clear that a write-down of African external debt stocks will have much impact, either on the
national income and product accounts or the poor of Africa. Local currency conversion of debt
servicing streams may be far more effective in relieving binding financial constraints to African
development.
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Table 1: Net Transfers on External Debt
Subsaharan African Countries, 1983-92
(positive net transfers indicate inflows to SSA)
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables
(all measured in US$)
Total Net Transfers

Net Transfers to
Official Creditors

Gross domestic product

0.027a
(0.006)

0.015 a
(0.005)

Gross domestic investment

0.151 a
(0.040)

0.046a
(0.023)

Exports of goods and
nonfactor services

-0.457a
(0.030)

-0.173 a
(0.021)

ODAflows

-0.188 b
(0.107)

-0.023
(0.060)

Total external debt

0.058 a
(0.016)
0.003
(0.013)

Official external debt
n

230

230

0.81

0.65

Standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions include unreported country and year-specific dummy
variables.
a

= statistically significant at I-percent level.

b

= statistically significant at 10-percent level.

Countries: Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia,
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao
Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Data source: World Bank, African Development Indicators 1994-95.
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Notes
1.

These and other debt statistics reported in the paper come from the World Bank's World Debt
Tables, adjusted to remove Namibia and South Africa, which have been included in the SSA
data since 1994. I thank Jon Sanford for making the adjusted data available.

2.

The Toronto terms were nonetheless significant for establishing a precedent in forgiving
export credits as well as development loans.

3.

It may also be true that the foreign exchange burden of debt servicing tempts governments

to devalue their currencies, prompting inflation and preemptive capital flight, both of which
discourage domestic investment.
4.

These include interest rates, maturities, renegotiation provisions, etc.

5.

This is Basu' s (1991) monotonicity postulate.

6.

Cline (1995) also advocates this, albeit following a very different approach.

7.

The need for prudent mercy is likewise invoked by debt forgiveness advocates who invoke
the specter of German debts "insufficiently forgiven" in the interwar period (Sonko, 1994).

8.

The Korean and Turkish cases come up frequently in discussions with Japanese about debt
forgiveness. Recall that both were major debtors in the 1970s and early 1980s, about which
many lenders were quite concerned, but they maintained debt servicing and have largely
grown out of their debt problems.

9.

Debt reduction programs in the context of Brady Plan agreements and IDA Debt Reduction
Facility initiatives reduced the affected countries' debt by only 9.8% as of end-1994. Debt
forgiveness over the past decade or so has been of a similar magnitude.

10.

The g~owth consequences of the debt renegotiation treadmill have been ( surprisingly)
overlooked in the literature and are the subject of current research by the author.

11.

Of course, this likewise suggests that net outflows of funds (i.e., negative net transfers)
reduce growth and investment.

12.

The concern about degrees of freedom is compounded by selectivity and censoring problems
in estimation since many sovereign SSA borrowers have self-selected out of private capital
markets and capital flight suggests that there is instead considerable (unobservable) private
lending from SSA to the rest of the world.

13.

For instance, perhaps private financing flows are affected only by arrears to private creditors,
although the commercial creditors with whom I worked in the 1980s on SSA were deeply
concerned about any arrears.
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14.

The U.S. government ran a scheme similar to this in El Salvador, in which the government
auctioned the foreign exchange it was scheduled to repay to the U.S. to domestic businesses
who needed it to buy imports. The government's local currency receipts were then used for
human capital programs, with apparent success. I thank Jon Sanford for calling this program
to my attention.
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